

Strategy Research Project

Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics

by

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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Abstract

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Pursuing the Human Domain Risks Reinvesting on the Basics

The use of the new words strongly indicates that those using them do not wish to be encumbered by a generally useful and coherent set of terms that the military history had previously used. As war and warfare are not changing in ways that demand new words, it is odd that people keep inventing them.

—William F. Owen¹

Military and defense writer/theorist

Introduction

America stands face-to-face with an impending fiscal crisis and all of government brace for its impact. As the effects of sequestration begin to take shape, the military services struggle to find efficiencies and effectiveness within their force structures while realizing massive cuts are just around the corner. The U.S. Army's analysis of its recent wars has generated an emerging term and concept to deal with the drawdown and to remain as an effective force. The "Human Domain" is not an epiphany, a remarkable term or likely to start a revolution in military affairs. In some fashion, the term does not lend credence to the fact that land forces have always operated amongst populations. The new term risks diverting the attention of U.S. land forces from concentrating on the essential capabilities, capacities and resources required to fulfill Department of Defense (DoD) 21st Century priorities. What are the real issues or challenges this cliché attempts to stopgap that are not sufficiently addressed by today's resources, processes or systems? Conventional Forces (CF) and Special Operations Forces (SOF) human domain advocates believe that the term will guide the Army, Marines and SOF into a renewed way of thinking about landpower's future role for U.S. 21st century security by capturing the past decade's Iraq and Afghanistan experiences. They define the human domain "as the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence

human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population-centric conflicts.”² SOF and CF can undoubtedly gain tremendous benefit by retaining these practices, especially those experiences learned by working amongst indigenous populations on a daily basis. But this should not be the sole focal point for guiding future force design and concepts. Unfortunately, some human domain advocates do not view it this way.

Concern should arise using the new term exclusively rather than thinking about it as a subset of the land domain, potentially violating the adage “planning for that last war”. Instead, generating force planners naturally account for populations inhabiting areas where land forces are likely to operate in future scenarios, but risk assessing indigenous civilians exclusively as only one aspect of the joint operating environment (JOE). The “Human Domain” inadvertently obscures the negative lessons learned from the last ten years, thereby diverting attention from making the right investment choices on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Logistics, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF). The Army, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the United States Marine Corps have the intellectual capital to include facets other than the human domain before moving too far forward on limiting initiatives for the future force. In today’s fiscally constrained and uncertain global security environment, land forces must focus on developing optimal landpower ways and means. Straying from the established training, doctrine and the terminology contained within, to prepare land forces for traditional and non-traditional warfare, is wasteful and distracting.

In his 2012 National Security Strategy (NSS), President Barack Obama highlighted the need for U.S. strategic focus to shift from the Middle East and Europe to primarily the Asia-Pacific region. Due to the current fiscal crisis and the resulting drawdown in forces, the U.S. Army has adopted a regional alignment strategy to meet the global requirements with ready forces. To prepare for this strategy, the Army will rely heavily on two of its components, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC). TRADOC will concentrate its energy on changing the Army's DOTMLPF to accommodate future capacity and capabilities of Army conventional forces, enabling them to operate more frequently amongst civilians in a range of military operations and across the full spectrum of conflict. USASOC shares similar responsibilities as TRADOC, but focuses solely on Army Special Operations Forces. USASOC will assume the additional charge of passing along its institutional operational indigenous experience to the Army. However, before USASOC Forces, specifically Special Forces (SF), begin the task of leading, teaching and integrating all that is human domain to its Army brethren, it must first reacquire some of these very skills itself. During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn, SF focused primarily on combat foreign internal defense while many of the skills normally associated with the human domain atrophied. Thus, while SF performance was brilliant in these wars, it lost much of the tactical acumen that President Kennedy intended of this force when he authorized the wear of the Green Beret in 1961. SF must restore its core skill sets to pre-war levels before it can perform at the peace end of the spectrum and lead the CF in operating in an asymmetrical landscape.

The Army, SOCOM and the Marine Corps must soon reach decisions on their plans to tailor their forces to comply with the President's new security policy and the DoD's priorities. Accordingly, Steven K. Metz, Director of Research and Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies, reported the announcement that the three agreed to "open an Office of Strategic Landpower"³ in 2013 with the role of burden sharing and coordinating land power concept development with overtures emphasizing the human domain. The venture has already started to divert time, resources and personnel away from traditional DOTMLPF processes. Conducting conferences or organizing temporary working groups seems reasonable to examine these issues, but creating a Landpower Office in times of austerity takes the initiative too far. TRADOC has a concept development organization, the Marine Corps has a Training and Education Command and SOCOM has Joint Special Operations University. All of these existing organizations are designed to address these important issues.

This paper explores the term "Human Domain" and determines its validity as a subset to land power's role in preparing forces, strategy formulation and operational execution. It also strives to answer whether or not defense professionals should adopt the Human Domain concept as an independent domain equal to the other joint domains. As these issues are explored, it is the intention of the author to contribute ideas toward improving strategic land power's policy and strategic potency. Advocates for SOF and CF interdependencies reason that introducing the "Human Domain" to the military culture raises awareness of the lessons learned in OEF and OIF, believing it will drive land forces in the critical direction it must orient towards for the future operational and

tactical level missions. However, will the introduction of the human domain significantly payoff for national ends more so than what existing doctrine offers? In an era in which the DoD will face significant fiscal constraints, it is imperative to ensure SOF and CF balance their forces in preparation for their missions in the traditional and non-traditional realms. Naturally, joint and service force providers should always pursue new concepts to exceedingly increase the forces' chances for mission success and so they may seamlessly integrate their capabilities within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational organization.

Background

The Army, SOCOM and the Marine Corps, together as force providers, are evaluating the security environment to determine the best ways and means for strategic landpower to meet the current and future strategic ends for the nation. The departure point for this assessment begins by using the ends that President Obama's policy direction set forth in the NSS. Force providers also assess DoD guidance, global threat forecasts, and lessons from the past decade of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are only a few of the areas of the JOE studied for the purpose of improving landpower's role in complementing the future joint force's ability to continue achieving U.S. strategic ends. In its White Paper, "Special Operations", the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina implies the land domain requires a refined definition or amplification. This institution considers *humans* as a separate domain, and by approaching it from this perspective will promote the Army's greater understanding of the operational environment. This seems reasonable, but the human domain will then become the loci driving improved interdependence

between SOF and CF, thus being “a critical and complementary concept to the recognized domains of land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace.”⁴ As a result, the new vision demonstrates how the “Army will be better enabled to win population-centric conflicts because SF will show them how to operate more culturally attuned.”⁵

Advocates Major General Bennet S. Sacolick and Brigadier General Wayne W. Grigsby Jr. wrote “the concept of the human domain is the cognitive foundation of the 7th Warfighting function’s lethal and non-lethal capabilities to assess, shape, deter and influence foreign security environments.”⁶ These advocates also propose Special Operations becoming a joint warfighting function, elevating it to a level on par with command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection and sustainment.⁷ How can one create a function that is based on a concept that does not meet the criteria of war domain in the first place?

Despite the good intentions to address the Army Chief of Staff’s Prevent, Shape and Win strategic framework,⁸ the advocates pushing for Special Operations as a separate function are contradicting the definition of “function” delineated in joint doctrine. Joint Publication 3-0 describes a “warfighting function” as “related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs [Joint Force Commanders] integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations.”⁹ Additionally, “forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. Individual Service capabilities often can support multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.”¹⁰

Special Operations Forces are neither a function nor a capability. SOF is a force unto itself and Special Operations, as the name implies, are operations. SOF brings

discrete capability to the JFC and they operate within the joint warfighting functions to generate combat power for the Commander. Joint Publication 3-05 describes in detail the capabilities this force brings to the fight.¹¹

Similarly, the SWCS White Paper describes the human domain as “a discipline that will institutionalize into U.S. Army doctrine the capabilities and skills necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner that allows us to bridge language barriers, open lines of communication and connect with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting.”¹² The human domain does not constitute a war domain, space or place, and should not be added to the lexicon of landpower. As it is not a domain neither SOF nor Army nor Marine Corps can dominate it or hold it. Thus, the argument of creating a seventh warfighting function based upon a non-existent domain cannot be used as justification for the same reasons that the services exist to serve in their legitimately defined domains. It is clearly understood that the Air Force operates in the air domain, the Navy and Marines in the maritime domain and the Army and Marines in the land domain. Satellites operate in the space domain and most of us operate in the cyber domain. The commonality in all of these domains is that they are all places. One can argue cyber isn’t an actual place, others will counter that it is a virtual place. Regardless of what side of that argument you fall on, how can human beings be considered a place? They can’t and the Army and SOF should stop trying to create an artificial domain and come to grips that humans are the key elements that operate across all the domains.

At a time where resources are scarce, the time, energy and resources spent redefining sufficient doctrine and missions is wasteful. Additionally, these proposed changes come with another price. The time spent by SOF to train CF will occur at the expense of “getting back to basics” with existing DOTMLPF force design solutions. History and doctrine are invaluable tools to understand this concept. Past Military Operations Other Than War and Low Intensity Conflict experiences offer institutional evidence of military operations amongst populations. Furthermore, current stability operations doctrine possesses appropriate methods to continue operating in this arena. Therefore, past experiences and current doctrine do not substantiate the need to further define the land domain to enhance US landpower.

U.S. Strategy Changes from Threat-Based to Capabilities-Based

Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the United States’ strategy dismissed the notion that terrorism would ever pose a threat of significant magnitude to America’s homeland. U.S. strategy was in transition after the Soviet Union dissolved. Geopolitical power shifted the international system’s order from a bipolar world to one of American global hegemony. The U.S. military had evolved from being a threat-based military to one based on capability because after the Soviet Union’s demise, no state posed a significant threat to U.S. national interests. Nevertheless, the “DoD needed a new strategy formulation process by which to continue developing means and ends for an even less certain security environment, which a ‘capabilities-based’ [planning system] could be used universally in different theaters against diverse foes.”¹³

However, that sole-super power prominence was short lived, and the strategic environment morphed into a more chaotic one, whereas more states vied for power using various means to advance their interests, including terror. Non-state actors

emerged but were not considered a serious threat as demonstrated by U.S. actions with the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, American Embassies in Africa and the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. These incidents did not heighten the defense establishment or conventional forces' regard for irregular, small scale, or asymmetrical warfare. None of these were considered a significant enough threat; the focus was on preparing for the next big war. "The idea mooted in the 1990's that the military should 'return' to its original purpose of 'fighting and winning the nation's wars — and, by extension, abandon the newfangled notion that it should be involved in numerous noncombatant situations — was itself the innovation, and a dangerous one.'"¹⁴ After 9/11, the DoD had no choice but to accept the requirement for capabilities-based contingency preparations. The single enemy threat was no longer there; the DoD had to face multiple state competitors and transnational threats making security more uncertain and the strategies to deal with them more challenging.

Looking Forward — Obama's Ends

The U.S. capabilities-based approach is still applicable and sufficient as long as equal emphasis is placed on both traditional and irregular warfare. President Obama revealed his strategic vision during a January 5, 2012 speech at the Pentagon. He declared his realigned security priorities for the United States, indicating that the restoration of the economy would be his number one focus.¹⁵ However, with the 2010 Budget Control Act cuts quickly approaching the deadline, an underlying purpose of his speech prompted the DoD to conduct a thorough strategic defense review to make tough choices that would accommodate the President's ends. In 2013, the DoD continues to implement new ways and means to achieve the President's new priorities

through its key strategic documents, transmitting refined requirements and tasks to the Services, Combatant Commands and the Defense Agencies. Additionally, the President stressed he wanted not only to continue focusing on current threats and operations, but wanted to give attention to the future, specifically by reducing force structure and rebalancing the Joint Force focus towards the Asia-Pacific region. The Commander in Chief wanted “to clarify [the U.S.] strategic interests in a fast-changing world, and to guide [its] defense priorities and spending over the coming decade — because the size and the structure of our military and defense budgets have to be driven by a strategy, not the other way around.”¹⁶ The DoD review did not deviate far from the President’s 2010 NSS whereas he aimed to revive American Global Leadership, ensure the US did not overextend its power, and declare the requirement to share the burden of security amongst allies and partners.¹⁷ The DoD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review also anticipated some of the President’s forthcoming direction and had already accounted for the capabilities the Department would need to sufficiently deploy to protect America’s interests. Given the status of the U.S. economy, the DoD already anticipated “doing more with less” prior to 2012, thus, “as challenges to the global order increase in scale and shift in form, the means for addressing them are actually declining.”¹⁸ Historical patterns reveal that defense force structures usually shrink after wars, particularly land forces. However, due to the severity of today's economic distress, it will require significantly deeper cuts than normal. “Doing more with less” will in fact be the way DoD does business in the foreseeable future.

Future Threats

International actors with maleficent intents and behaviors, combined with their unfettered access to technologies, weapons and disaffected people, continue to make it

difficult for the U.S. government to understand the strategic environment and to take the necessary precautions to protect the nation. The world today is truly global; it is one that technologies have sped up, flattened, and created opportunities that have brought people closer. These dynamics made some more prosperous and others not so much. Conversely, those same factors also produced unintended consequences, which created economic and social disparity, ruined ecosystems and created greater polarizations among people. The negative trends of these factors' dynamics thereby created conditions whereas some states, individuals and organizations chose antisocial means to resolve their grievances, often resorting to a range of irregular tools to disrupt or bring harm to others within the international system. When a state chooses to partake in such activities, it is easily identified and courses of action taken by the international community often result. These can be in the form of United Nations Security Council resolutions admonishing their behavior, sanctions imposed against them, or in many cases, military action. However, when the rogues are non-state sponsored organizations or individuals working on their own behalf, this can become difficult to counter. Typically, these adversaries are members of indigenous populations, often living and working amongst their fellow villagers, but covertly planning and operating for their next strike. The U.S. government labels these individuals and organizations as "terrorists", insurgents", and "guerrillas."

Defeating these threats is difficult and even more so with the application of conventional force. This is the area where the JFC can leverage Special Operations capabilities and forces to infiltrate these nefarious networks. SOF members are specifically trained to operate in this environment, whereas the CF is not. Living

amongst the indigenous population, forging relationships of trust and gaining favor from the locals is really the only way to effectively dismantle these terrorist organizations. Soldiers with minimal “human domain” training will be ill-equipped to establish the bonds and trust that will get them the information they need about these individuals or organizations. As concerning as improvised explosive devices have been for the U.S. during the past two wars, “irregular warfare will be transformed to the point that the roadside bomb threats that the United States has spent tens of billions of dollars defending against in Iraq and Afghanistan may seem trivial by comparison. The spread of nuclear weapons to the developing world is equally alarming.”¹⁹ Andrew Krepinevich’s point with these statements highlights the importance of a well-trained, well-resourced, skilled Special Operation Force that can assimilate with the local populations, infiltrate the enemy networks and prevent future havoc.

“Indeed, important military shifts have already been set in motion that will be difficult if not impossible to reverse. Sadly, these developments, combined with others in the economic, geopolitical, and demographic realms, seem likely to make the world a less stable and more dangerous place.”²⁰ Without trained, seasoned land domain professionals in place to mitigate these risks, a less stable world could be catastrophic for the U.S.

New Ways, Means and Risk

“While it’s easy to project the Pacific Rim as a potential battleground for air and naval forces, they alone will not be able to win the fight; that will continue to take a Joint Force. The Army’s critical role in this fight will be in the Unified Land Operations where success in the Human Domain remains the vital element.”²¹ Of course the Army will play a critical role if there is a war in this area of operations; the DoD strategy does not

discount the Army's role in this type of traditional warfare. However, does the Army really require unqualified success in the Human Domain? If this term had not recently been created, could they not still be successful? The CF Army will face the challenge of balancing its land war dominance (with an eye towards the Asia-Pacific theater) with an increased participation in shaping and deterring missions. The Army's participation in shaping operations will reduce some of the partnership training burden on SOF by conducting security force assistance and building partnership capacity missions with other conventional forces, allowing SOF to focus training on host partners' SOF.

There will be an initial investment to build and maintain "shaping" proficiencies for the CF in this theater, but those investments are adequate for their required mission sets and will not reduce the Army's effectiveness. It is not cost effective or feasible to train numerous CF personnel to SOF standards. Nevertheless, the costs involved will not be as great as some think because the regionally aligned forces will not require intensive cultural and immersion training. The Army just needs to apply the formula it used during the recent wars to train the indigenous security forces. This methodology proved to be highly effective and can be applied with the same degree of success to the Army's regionally aligned forces to shape, prevent and deter conflict in irregular mission roles.

However, the U.S. cannot just shift assets to the Asia-Pacific region; the lines of communication are long and it takes time to establish a robust theater. The DoD has elected to reposition Navy and Air Force assets in the Pacific Command Area theater due to the vast size of this region's maritime environment, while simultaneously decreasing landpower forces. By adopting this strategy, the DoD assumes risk that a

full-scale war is not likely in the foreseeable future. The United States focus in this region merely acknowledges a shift in the rising populations and economic growth in some of the Asian countries, particularly China and India.

Furthermore, the U.S. cannot just ignore the rest of the world. Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to require engagement. As the CF draws down from the former, engagement is still required to prevent the safe haven for terrorists. Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is also of concern; therefore, ignoring either of these countries is not an option. Perhaps, the role for land forces in this arena is building partnership capacities and conducting similar mission as envisioned in all Geographic Commandant Commanders' Phase 0 Theater Security Campaign plans.

Impacts of Pursuing the Human Domain

Exploring the term "human domain" wastes effort, time and resources focusing on an obvious and trivial aspect of preparing land forces, including SOF, for all future conflict challenges. Perhaps it does not seem rigorous enough to deal with future security challenges just by using adequately existing tools to develop capable CF and SF to deal with every contingency, especially in a fiscally constrained environment. If the advice of today's military leaders cannot influence civilian leadership to scale back their ends proportionately relative to the actual means available or the levels the DoD will be reduced to, then the Army and SOF leaders should not contribute more to the country's burden. Pursuing superfluous terms or obvious concepts constitutes abdication of common sense. This is not the first time the military has been asked to do more with less after a conflict. Also, this is not the first time U.S. forces have been directed to operate across the full spectrum of military missions amongst non-military civilians or in an environment of uncertainty. Although the fiscal challenges facing the

country today are more severe than most other times in U.S. history, it does not mean the Army or SOF cannot succeed in fulfilling its roles and missions in a fiscally responsible way. Thus, the argument is against introducing nonsensical terms, and it is not against the concept or the need to improve land forces operating amongst people. Spending time on such things or linking future conceptual constructs for these types of terms wastes personnel time and resources.

Personnel

As the US military continues to draw down personnel, more than ever it is imperative that essential tasks are prioritized over non-essential ones as there are not enough people to accomplish both. The Chief of Staff of the Army General Raymond T. Odierno announced that “the Army expects an active force end strength reduction from 570,000 to 490,000” (2012 to 2017), continuing on to say “even given a fiscally constrained environment our Army will accomplish our reductions in a responsible and controlled manner.”²² The Army does this by focusing on the enduring concept of military common sense, while fundamentally following the principles of wars. The management of personnel and the projects they work on matter must remain focused on those that matter most for national security. This notion does not suggest to cut out quality problem solving, but rather pursuing ideas and courses of action that do not have high pay off are wasteful. The Army and SOF can spend their time much more fruitfully on important issues rather than holding forums on operating in the human domain. Army staffs are already challenged to maintain full Manning; some more so than others. For example, assume the Army’s 14% reduction happened evenly to all active component units and staffs, then where would the Army find the extra personnel needed to establish organizations such as the Strategic Landpower Office? Would they

continue to tax these already undermanned staffs or would they close some other staff units and absorb their personnel to lessen the impact? Diminishing resources require organizations to streamline for effectiveness and efficiency. Therefore, it is important that organizations such as TRADOC (and other service equivalent units) tackle issues like the "human domain" wisely and cost effectively. Of course, the requirements and inputs of the Combatant Commands would definitively continue to inform the discussion cobbling out the best way ahead for Army and SOF employment. However, new entities, created solely to answer questions like these in pursuit of defining landpower's role for the future wastes time and money.

Resources

As precious as time is, in today's fiscal austerity, money is even more so. Introducing new terminology, doctrine or just modifying existing concepts is costly. The Army should remain confident that its landpower role remains secure as does SOF and does not need to expend precious resources to get people together to deliberate on a term or concept for a part of war that it has always had dealt with—people. Institutionally the Army and SOF have always operated among people and the Army should confidently state so, but it has always been awkward doing so. Douglas Ollivant, a retired Army Officer, and Senior Fellow supports this assertion by stating "The Army has long been known to be strategically inarticulate, unable to effectively express its role in the larger defense establishment since the fall of the Berlin Wall."²³ Mr. Ollivant further describes the Army's difficulty in defining its strategies to the detriment of not getting the resources it needs to prepare for the nation's future. "If the Army is unable to clearly articulate why it will need resources -- people, money, equipment -- for the United States' most likely contingencies, it risks having these resources diverted to deal

with far less likely situations. And that would leave the Pentagon dangerously ill-prepared to face the very real threats that America faces in the coming decades.”²⁴ Yet, while the Army is strategically awkward, it wastes resources over preparing its "strategic coming out."

So how wasteful is this effort to implement the "human domain" into the Army's lexicon and its intended role of shaping land power? It is incalculable without tremendous effort, but if one were to account for all the expenses associated with the conferences that address this issue, it would be of significance. The commercial airline tickets, temporary duty per diem expenses, rental cars, hotel rooms, supplies, energy, paper and the labor to make slides over and over again, are dollars that could be better spent. And, this tally only describes the cost associated with exploration of the future of land power and the relevancy of "human domain" as a term. It does not consider all the resource expenditures involved in pulling people away from Army, SOCOM and Marine staffs, or diverting personnel from assignments, the cost of office space, and the countless hours of preparation for briefing after briefing to weigh-in on the human domain and its future role in land power. These costs do not justify supporting the Secretary's intent of working in a fiscally constrained environment. Resources are easily preserved if the Army, SOCOM and the Marines use their existing concept development organizations to develop future landforce structure. Similarly, they have the information they need to implement their concepts without "trying to reinvent the wheel." There are reams and reams of lessons learned residing in repositories that include Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Storm, Restore Hope, Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, just to name a few. Good stewardship and access to historical files such as

these are more than enough to pull out the best lessons for operating amongst humans. Additionally, the services and SOCOM have in house historians who can also lend in the effort thus eliminating the temptation to expend money on outside consultants or contractors to augment research for the Service Chiefs and SOCOM Commander.

Conclusion

There is no validity in qualifying humans as a separate domain, and thus disqualifies the major initiative that the land forces and SOF wanted to develop — a seventh warfighter function that aspired to bolster landpower's strategic role in the future. This effort is not awash because it generated many salient ideas for land forces and SOF to pursue, especially capturing the integration of SOF and CF, making them naturally more interdependent. But, pursuing this venture further will only eat up more and more valuable resources, detouring precious personnel, time and resources away from using the tools we fundamentally have to shape the land forces for future conflicts. The whole pursuit runs counter to the new DoD guidance "to reduce the costs of doing business...so that more limited resources may be better tuned to their requirements."²⁵ Hence, there are more than sufficient DOTMLPF solutions land forces and SOF can use to retain their lessons and prepare for the irregular warfare realm. Why are services just now having these future war conversations, and why do are new these terms try to address problems that have not changed? William F. Owen explains:

Complex warfare will take place in complex terrain, which is essentially terrain that restricts the use of weapons and sensors...within complex terrain, there will be civilian populations, now called human terrain, and these will further restrict the use of weapons...Future war will be conducted around and within populations, because wars are and always have been about people...the new vocabulary has perhaps found its first physical expression in the form of human terrain teams...but in that no way justifies their existence. The British Empire [circa Boer War]

answered all the same questions [about the population], without human terrain teams.²⁶

It is suffice to say that Mr. Owen's argument stands to reason today and suggests that professionals need to apply more of their military history and the existing tools when working out future force problems. By doing so, it will save time and resources for deriving solutions within existing means. Occasionally, fresh definitions are truly needed for things truly virgin to our collective experiences – encountering human beings in war is not one of those virgin things.

Applying the same logic of adding a new war fighting function to the joint fray is also debunked because SOF is a force vice a function. SOF coordination inherently serves the function of synchronizing its operations with the JFC's intent to achieve desired ends, including strategic ends.

Moreover, these premises do not qualify as a term or an approach that strategically enhances land power's role significantly beyond what the current doctrine or means can sufficiently accomplish. Upon the conclusion of Afghanistan, the U.S. military will increasingly find itself performing "phase 0, shaping operations...designed to deter or dissuade adversaries, and assure friends"²⁷ in support of achieving the ends of the NSS, and the DoD priorities. The DoD has the best land forces with the best doctrine in place to meet those challenges, and these forces will remain the best even during this fiscal crisis.

Endnotes

¹ William F. Owen, "The War of New Words: Why Military History Trumps Buzzwords," *Armed Forces Journal*, November 2009), 9.

² Bennet S. Sacolick and Wayne W. Grigsby Jr., "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win'," *Army*, June 2012, 39.

³ Steven Metz, "Strategic Horizons: U.S. Army Prepares For Human Domain Of War," November 7, 2012, <http://wpr.vu/f5RAU> (accessed March 2, 2013).

⁴ Army Special Operations Capabilities Center, Capabilities Development Integration Directorate, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, "*Special Operations White Paper*," Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1.

⁵ Sacolick and Grigsby, "Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence: A Critical Role in 'Prevent, Shape, Win'," 40.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III-1.

⁸ Army Special Operations Capabilities Center, "*Special Operations White Paper*," 1.

⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, III-1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Special Operations*, Joint Publications 3-05, (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 18, 2011), ix.

¹² Army Special Operations Capabilities Center, "*Special Operations White Paper*," 2.

¹³ Jeffery B. Kendall, "Capabilities Based Planning: The Myth," (National Defense University, National War College, 17 April, 2002), https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:S7QF7H4rDV0J:www.hsdl.org/?view%26did%3D461707+when+did+the+US+Military+become+a+capability+based?&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEEShHgZtoHD-jQiQm61a2yoL6QE_-7qZk1DuTh_A-vfz6UkZaJUdUseY91VbiZnO0H10F484MNWVw2gSqNovCKH8MiK4QaR1XyV360mm0iasZB7cWzZf_KL_o0EDHqknRHD_Cep4&sig=AHIEtbRT-Kzc1y6l_nl1kt4mm9ntBteWWw, 1. (accessed February 28, 2013).

¹⁴ Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, *Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power*, (American Enterprise Institute Press, 2008), 12-13.

¹⁵ Barack Obama, *Remarks on Defense Strategic Review* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 5, 2012), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/05/remarks-president-defense-strategic-review> (accessed February 28, 2013).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Barack Obama, *National Security Strategy*, (Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010), i-1.

¹⁸ Andrew Krepinevich, *The Future is Now: An FP Special Report*, Get Ready for the Democratization of Destruction, The way the world militaries wage war is going to change -- Drastically, (Foreign Policy, September 2011), 2.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., 1.

²¹ Major General Robert B. Brown and Major Ronald W. Sprang, Human Domain: Essential to Victory in Future Operations, Briefing/Paper. 2012, 1.

²² C. Todd Lopez, "Odierno: Force Reductions will be Responsible, Controlled," January 27, 2012, <http://soldiers.dodlive.mil/2012/01/odierno-force-reductions-will-be-responsible-controlled/> (accessed March 10, 2013).

²³ Douglas A. Ollivant, "Go Army, Beat Navy: Forget Ships and Drones: The Future of War is Still on Land," September 28, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/28/go_army_beat_navy (accessed March 10, 2013).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Leon Panetta, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 7.

²⁶ William F. Owen, "The War of New Words: Why Military History Trumps Buzzwords," 9, 35.

²⁷ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, V-8.

